In the previous article on this topic, which focused on the prospects for the Russian AWACS program, we examined possible platforms for developing next-generation long-range early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft.
As the range of air-to-air missiles and surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) increases, the threat of destroying long-range early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft which are based on heavy transport aircraft, such as the Il-76, and narrow-body passenger or special-purpose aircraft, such as the Tu-214. At the same time, uncertainty regarding the prospects for the Il-112V, Il-212, and Il-114-300 aircraft hinders the development of an equivalent to the American E-2 “Hokai.”
As for the Sukhoi Superjet New and MC-21 civilian aircraft mentioned in the comments on the previous article, they are in the early stages of service and will be in high demand in civil aviation in the coming years. Adapting these aircraft for military purposes would take a considerable amount of time, which makes the Tu-214 a more preferable option, given the availability of its variants for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF RF).
In any case, all of these aircraft are extremely vulnerable to long-range air-to-air missiles and enemy air defense systems. The detection range of an Il-76-type transport aircraft and its derivatives by the radar system of a Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft is approximately 500–600 kilometers, whereas for the Tu-214, this figure is slightly lower—450–550 kilometers.
Even if the enemy does not have any AWACS aircraft, our “large” AEW&C aircraft will be detected by tactical aviation’s electronic intelligence (EI) systems based on their own emissions, allowing them to be attacked from a distance of several hundred kilometers.
The risk of AEW&C assets being destroyed can be reduced by creating a distributed system, which we will tentatively call “Argus.”
Given the limited selection of unmanned platforms with sufficient payload capacity to carry an effective radar system (RLK) capable of detecting targets at an acceptable range, the most promising AEW&C platform (without command and control capabilities due to the absence of on-board operators) among the existing fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is the S-70 “Okhotnik.”
What are the advantages of this platform?
Contents:
S-70 “Okhotnik” UAV
First, the S-70 “Okhotnik” UAV has low detectability in the thermal and radar wavelength ranges.
It might seem that low observability isn’t important for an AEW&C aircraft, given that its radar operates in active mode and emits a strong signal that can be detected from hundreds of kilometers away.
However, low observability plays an important role when facing attacks from air-to-air missiles or long-range air defense systems. The active radar homing heads (ARH) of air-to-air missiles and air defense missile systems have lower sensitivity than the powerful radars of fighter jets and air defense missile systems. Consequently, low observability significantly reduces the probability that an air platform will be detected by the active radar seeker of an attacking missile, and also reduces the range over which it can be tracked by the aircraft’s radar or an air defense missile system.
Upon detecting an attack, the AEW&C UAV’s radar should be shut down. Below, we will examine in detail the tactics for defending the S-70 “Okhotnik”-based AEW&C UAV against long-range air-to-air missiles and enemy air defense systems.
Second, the S-70 “Okhotnik” UAV has a long range and endurance of approximately 6,000 kilometers. This is less than that of the American strategic reconnaissance UAV, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, but more than that of other Russian manned and unmanned aircraft with comparable payload capacity. It is possible that the range and loitering time will be increased during further development.
Third, its significant payload capacity—ranging from 3 to 8 metric tons, according to various sources—combined with a spacious internal payload compartment, will allow for the installation of a highly effective radar system.
Given these advantages, two components of a spatially distributed, multi-purpose aerial reconnaissance system could be developed based on the S-70 “Okhotnik”: the S-70RR UAV for radar reconnaissance and the S-70VR UAV for high-altitude reconnaissance.
S-70RR AEW&C UAV
The modification of the S-70 “Okhotnik” into the S-70RR AEW&C UAV is fairly straightforward: the equipment required to house weapons in the internal compartment is removed from the airframe. Instead, an airborne electronic intelligence system is installed, comprising a radar and radio-technical reconnaissance (RTR) equipment, as well as high-speed encrypted communications equipment, including satellite communications.
Presumably, the optimal solution would be to install a retractable side-looking radar with a flat antenna array in the internal compartment—for example, an enlarged active phased array antenna (APAA) from the “Belka” radar system of the fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jet.
Another solution can also be used as the basis for a radar system. In Russia, a significant number of radar systems of various types exist and are under development, primarily based on passive phased array antennas (PFA), which, despite being considered outdated technology, have not yet exhausted their potential.
Various options are possible: a single-panel array capable of rotating 180 degrees, or a dual-panel array capable of scanning in both directions perpendicular to the direction of travel of the S-70RR AEW&C UAV. An additional sensor array can be mounted in the nose of the UAV to provide coverage of the forward hemisphere.
There is nothing new about this configuration: a large, fixed radar array that scans the airspace perpendicular to the direction of flight, supplemented by smaller radar arrays pointing forward and backward, is used in nearly all new AEW&C aircraft designs. The massive “mushroom” antenna above the fuselage is gradually being phased out.
The S-70RR UAV is designed to perform not only AEW&C missions, but also radar reconnaissance of ground targets and Earth surface mapping using synthetic aperture radar, although air target detection remains the priority.
S-70VR UAV
Active radar reconnaissance should not be the sole mission of the spatially distributed, multi-purpose “Argus” aerial reconnaissance system.
The previous article, “The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Bold Raids—A Consequence of the Russian Armed Forces’ Lack of Modern Reconnaissance Satellites and High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft,” discussed the lag of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) in the field of strategic high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. The use of the S-70 “Okhotnik” platform could potentially help resolve this issue as well.
The main difference between the S-70VR UAV and the S-70RR UAV is the maximum possible reduction in weight. Instead of a bulky under-fuselage radar, a highly efficient optoelectronic station (OES) is to be installed, including day, night, and thermal imaging channels, radar-transponder equipment, and, possibly, a compact radar for sector-based target search.

Конструктивно ОЭС должна быть убирающейся в корпус БПЛА (или иметь закрывающиеся шторки), РЛС и антенны оборудования РТР должны быть выполнены конформно или также убираться в корпус.Если для БПЛА С-70РР основными целями являются воздушные, то БПЛА С-70ВР в первую очередь предназначен для поиска и распознавания наземных (надводных) целей. Обе машины должны дополнять возможности друг друга.
Developing a high-altitude reconnaissance drone based on the S-70 “Okhotnik” seems logical for several reasons. First, according to publicly available data, the S-70 “Okhotnik” has a practical service ceiling of 18,000 meters, which is comparable to the flight altitude of the RQ-4 Global Hawk. Even if, in reality, the S-70VR’s stable cruising altitude is slightly more than 15,000 meters—or even less—this will be quite sufficient for most missions, especially given the aircraft’s low observability.
Second, it appears that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) will gradually phase out the RQ-4 Global Hawk in favor of the low-observable RQ-180 White Bat, which is capable of surviving in challenging air combat environments.
By using the S-70 “Okhotnik” as the basis for a high-altitude reconnaissance UAV, we are effectively “skipping over” the RQ-4 Global Hawk generation and moving on to aircraft like the RQ-180 White Bat, although the S-70VR will not be a direct counterpart to the new American high-altitude reconnaissance UAV, at least due to its significantly shorter range. However, this issue will most likely be resolved by optimizing the turbojet engine for flight at the relevant altitudes, as well as by reducing the structure’s mass—including through the extensive use of composite materials, a technique currently being tested on new civil aviation aircraft.
Tu-214VPU “Dirizher”
A major problem hindering the Russian Aerospace Forces’ use of UAVs is the lack of modern, high-speed, encrypted satellite communications with low signal latency—this applies fully to the S-70RR / S-70VR UAVs. However, even if such communications are available, there is always a risk that the enemy could disable them, especially during a confrontation with a formidable adversary.
Thus, in order to ensure both the control of the S-70RR and S-70VR UAVs themselves and the processing of the intelligence data they provide, a control center is needed. It can be assumed that the optimal platform for this would be the Tu-214 medium-range aircraft, a hypothetical modification of which we will designate as the Tu-214VPU (airborne command post) “Dirizher.”
In essence, the Tu-214VPU “Dirizher” could become the simplest component of a spatially distributed, multi-purpose aerial reconnaissance complex, since variants such as the Tu-214R (a reconnaissance aircraft for electronic and optoelectronic reconnaissance) and the Tu-214SR (a relay aircraft for the Office of the President of the Russian Federation) that possess partially similar capabilities. It is worth noting that the Tu-214SR variant has an extended range of up to 10,000 kilometers.
Composition of the complex and tactics for its use
Presumably, the spatially distributed “Argus” AEW&C system will consist of one Tu-214VPU “Dirizher” aircraft, four S-70RR AEW UAVs, and two S-70VR UAVs.
In this configuration, the “Argus” system should be capable of monitoring approximately 1,000 kilometers along the front line, replacing two conventional AEW&C aircraft, surpassing them in radar field density, the ability to detect and classify various types of air and ground (surface) targets, and resistance to enemy attacks.
Accordingly, within this configuration, four S-70RR AEW&C UAVs conduct patrols along a predetermined trajectory (most likely an ellipse or a figure-eight) at a distance of approximately 200 kilometers from one another, at an altitude of approximately 10,000–12,000 meters. The UAVs’ flight paths can be synchronized using special algorithms to minimize “blind spots.”
S-70VR high-altitude reconnaissance UAVs should conduct patrols roughly above them or slightly ahead of them at an altitude of approximately 15,000–18,000 meters.
Together, they form a spatially distributed structure in which the capabilities of the sensors will complement one another. Targets detected by the S-70RR AEW&C UAV’s radar can undergo follow-up search and identification using the S-70VR UAV’s electronic support measures (ESM) system. The radar systems on both the S-70RR AEW&C UAV and the S-70VR UAV must operate as a single unit, ensuring increased accuracy in detecting radio-emitting objects due to the large triangulation span.
Tu-214VPU Airborne Command Post “Dirizher,” from which all UAVs in the group will be controlled, information received from them will be processed, and target designations will be issued to aircraft and other weapons systems of the Russian Armed Forces, must be located behind, at a distance of approximately 400–600 kilometers, depending on the distance at which stable communication can be maintained despite possible interference.
In the long term, the implementation of domestic high-speed satellite communications projects will make it possible to operate without the Tu-214VPU “Dirizher,” operating the S-70RR and S-70VR AEW&C UAVs directly from a ground control station. Communication repeaters may also be used both to increase the distance between the S-70RR / S-70VR and the Tu-214VPU “Dirizher,” as well as to control the S-70RR and S-70VR UAVs from a ground control station.
Relay equipment can (and should) be included as part of the specified S-70RR / S-70VR UAVs; in this case, the UAVs positioned deep within the combat formations and serving as relays can be considered a reserve in case of the loss of “front-line” UAVs. And while operating in the rear and serving as relays, the S-70RR UAVs can additionally monitor the airspace for the presence of enemy long-range precision-guided weapons—primarily low-flying cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs that have breached the first “line of defense.”
At altitudes of around 10,000–15,000 meters, dense cloud cover is usually absent, which makes it possible to consider using direct laser links between the S-70RR / S-70VR and the Tu-214VPU “Dirizher”—in this case, it would be impossible in principle to jam such a system. Technologies for direct, high-speed inter-satellite laser communication have been developed in the United States as part of the Starlink system, and similar work is underway here as well.
Self-Defense
Let’s talk a little about the self-defense capabilities of the S-70RR and S-70VR UAVs in the event of an attack by enemy air-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft missiles.
If enemy air-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft missiles are detected being launched or approaching, the targeted aircraft shuts down all active radio-emitting equipment, after which it automatically performs an evasive maneuver, orienting the airframe toward the attacking missiles in a way that minimizes radar and thermal emissions, while simultaneously deploying defensive decoys.
At the same time, the vehicles positioned closest to the targeted UAV carry out electronic jamming “from the side.” According to publicly available information, this tactic is the most effective for preventing enemy “air-to-air” missiles or anti-aircraft missiles from locking onto a target, as the jamming is carried out not by the aircraft under attack itself, but by other aircraft in the formation.

Conclusions
The development of the spatially distributed AEW&C system / the “Argus” integrated aerial reconnaissance system will enable Russia to quickly close the gap in both AEW&C aircraft and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, providing the Russian Armed Forces with the information superiority necessary to secure strategic air superiority.
By all accounts, the S-70 “Okhotnik” UAV is the optimal platform for developing the S-70RR and S-70VR UAVs—in terms of flight endurance, the ability to carry a relatively large and heavy radar system (compared to the capabilities of other UAVs currently in our arsenal), the platform’s expected proximity to mass production, and its enhanced survivability on the battlefield due to the use of stealth technologies.
There should be even fewer issues with the development of the Tu-214VPU “Dirizher,” since reconnaissance and command-and-control aircraft based on this model have already been developed.
The use of the “Argus” system in the configuration described here will make it possible to create an impenetrable shield against enemy air attacks, spanning a width of approximately 1,000 kilometers or more, when several “flocks” operate simultaneously.
Of course, the “Argus” AEW&C system can only achieve maximum effectiveness through close integration with other platforms—manned and unmanned aircraft and helicopters, ground-based radars, electronic warfare equipment, and possibly even satellite reconnaissance assets. However, the challenge of integrating the various components of the Russian Armed Forces into a unified system is an entirely different story.










