The History of the Most Unusual Soviet Tactical Missile System, the “Yastreb.” Why Would a Tactical Missile System Need Radar?
How can a tactical nuclear warhead be delivered to the enemy’s position? In the first half of the 1960s, the Soviet Army addressed this challenge using the “Luna” tactical missile systems and the “Luna-M,” which appeared shortly thereafter. These systems delivered a warhead with a yield of approximately 10 kilotons to ranges of about 30 and 60 kilometers, respectively.
Both systems remained in service for a long time, both in the USSR and abroad (with missiles lacking a special warhead), and generally proved themselves to be effective. However, they also had a significant drawback: the missiles were unguided. Aiming was achieved by rotating the launch vehicle and by the angle at which the missile was oriented at launch. In flight, the missile was stabilized solely by aerodynamic stabilizers and the spin imparted at launch by four engines mounted in the center of the missile (Luna-M).
As a result, the circular probability of error relative to the aiming point could reach 700 m. And don’t think that the presence of a nuclear warhead compensates for the lack of accuracy: for a warhead with a yield of about 10 KT, such a miss significantly reduces the damage inflicted on the target. Therefore, to guarantee a hit, it would be necessary to launch not just one, but several missiles. Obviously, the missile would have had to be guided in some way during flight.
Contents:
Idea
To identify ways to solve the problem, the 3rd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense conducted research under the code name “Kholm.” As a result, two approaches were identified: the creation of a missile with an inertial guidance system and the development of a missile guided to its target by radio command.
The first project was codenamed “Tochka,” and the second, “Yastreb.” OKB-2 of the State Committee for Aerospace Technology (GKAT), now JSC “MKB Fakel,” was designated as the lead organization for both projects. Both then and now, the company has specialized in anti-aircraft missiles.
I should note that this is not the same “Tochka” that was adopted for service in 1975. The first project with that code name, on which OKB-2 was working, was never completed. All materials were transferred to the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau, which would eventually develop the now well-known 9K79 “Tochka” system. But that would be an entirely different system.
Concept
The system, developed under the “Yastreb” program, was intended to be mounted on a high-mobility vehicle chassis.
The ballistic missile for the “Yastreb” was developed based on the existing V-611 (4K60) missile from the M-11 “Shtorm” naval air defense system, which had also been developed shortly before that at OKB-2. The design of the casing and wings, the guidance system, the engine, and several other components were borrowed from it. Such standardization was intended to significantly speed up and reduce the cost of the entire program, but things turned out differently in the end.
According to available information, the missile was intended to be equipped exclusively with a special (nuclear) warhead. Compared to the standard warhead of an anti-aircraft missile, it was heavier, which altered the missile’s balance. To compensate for this, the nose cone was equipped with destabilizers.
A stabilizer is a horizontal control surface mounted in front of the wing and designed to provide or improve the aircraft’s longitudinal control.
The rocket launched from a beam-type launch pad.
At the front of the chassis, behind the control cabin, was a radar station, which was perhaps the most distinctive feature of the “Yastreb” tactical missile complex.
The plan was that, once activated, the radar would track the missile’s trajectory, and the control system’s automatic mechanisms—by comparing the current and desired trajectories—would transmit commands via a radio channel to the actuators of the control surfaces to correct the flight path toward the target. Control was to be maintained throughout the entire active phase.
In theory, this guidance method was supposed to ensure the required accuracy parameters at a relatively low cost per missile, since all the automatic systems were located on the launcher, and the missile merely received control commands.
However, this solution also had its drawbacks. In particular, after launch, the combat vehicle could not immediately move from its launch position to cover, as it had to track the missile for a certain amount of time.
Furthermore, in order to control the missile’s flight, there were to be no obstacles between the missile and the launch unit that would block the radio signal or cause interference. For this reason, for example, the use of the “Yastreb” in mountainous terrain would have been virtually impossible.
At the same time, it is important to remember that an active radar also exposes the installation to the enemy’s electronic intelligence systems, and the control radio channels may be vulnerable to electronic warfare systems.
Yes, in the 1960s they weren’t as advanced as they are today, but I’m sure that if the “Yastreb” had been adopted, the Americans would inevitably have begun developing countermeasures at an accelerated pace.
Incarnation
Work on the “Yastreb” project did not progress beyond the preliminary design stage. Only a few individual elements were implemented in prototypes. Why was the development canceled? Most likely, several factors played a role. First, the combat vehicle turned out to be very complex and expensive due to the use of radar and automated systems for missile control.
The missile itself, which was based on a design for an air defense missile system, apparently did not meet the range requirements (8–35 km). The original V-611 could engage air targets at ranges of up to 55 km, but for the “Yastreb,” the missile was reconfigured as a ballistic missile and equipped with a heavier, specialized warhead, which negatively affected its range. Most likely, the designers concluded that it was pointless to expect a longer range within the existing size constraints.
The only component of the system that underwent active field testing was the chassis.
Various sources claim that the Bryansk and Kutaisi Automobile Plants, as well as the Mytishchi Machine-Building Plant, were involved in developing the “Yastreb” platform. At the same time, in the only available footage from the chassis tests, one can make out the Mytishchi facility No. 560 with a scale model of the radar system.
It is possible that Object 1040—which was being developed by KAZ engineers to house the future “Osa” air defense missile system—was considered as a chassis option. This was a development of the Object 1015B armored personnel carrier, which was discussed in one of our previous articles.
The fate of this prototype developed by engineers from Georgia ultimately did not pan out: the production-ready “Osu” was installed on a vehicle from BAZ.
The project to develop a tactical missile system codenamed “Yastreb” was terminated no later than 1966. Work on the “Tochka” system with inertial guidance was also halted at that time. The documents related to it were transferred to the Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau (KBM), which successfully completed the task: in 1975, the 9K79 “Tochka” tactical missile system was adopted for service. But this was already a completely different system.
