In the Soviet Union, the Soviet-German phase of World War II began with a preemptive German deployment and a swift offensive that destroyed a significant portion of the prewar stockpiles of weapons, trained commanders, and the economic base. Despite this, however, the Red Army launched a strategic counteroffensive as early as that winter. German generals claim that they retreated under the pressure of the snow and that Soviet troops were simply passing through the area, but the fact remains that by winter the Red Army was able to halt and counterattack the enemy. Although it was merely a shadow of the pre-war Red Army. While it could be said that the tanks and perhaps the aircraft were obsolete, the same certainly could not be said of the artillery—most artillery systems were relatively modern and remained in use until the end of the war, as did the infantry’s weapons. The same applies to the vast number of Red Army soldiers and commanders lost in encirclements; they were a very valuable resource for victory. Even with heavy losses, they could have inflicted far greater losses on the Wehrmacht.
From my perspective, the most important factor in improving the Red Army’s effectiveness was the accumulation of combat experience. This experience made it possible to promote capable commanders to the top, dramatically improve military doctrine by testing it in practice, and train soldiers under conditions identical to those of actual combat. But this learning process came at too high a cost in blood. Consequently, among other things, conscripts and those serving in alternative service are tasked with preventing the enemy from outmaneuvering the Red Army in operational deployment and avoiding massive losses of inexperienced soldiers in the early stages of the war. And virtually the entire army was inexperienced.
The goal of outpacing the Wehrmacht in deployment is unachievable—Germany carried out its mobilization much faster than the USSR, and once mobilized, it would take the Germans far less time than the USSR to redeploy the Wehrmacht to the borders. The main factor is geography. Even without considering factors such as the density of the railroad network and the number of trains, the USSR finds itself at a disadvantage—it takes longer to travel from Chelyabinsk to the front than from Munich. We mustn’t forget that the Germans already have units ready for action, while the USSR, ideally, would need time to coordinate them—and there isn’t even enough time for the redeployment itself. Some of this could be offset by a covert mobilization under the guise of a BUS, but this is 1—risky (if 5 million people are called up for the BUS, the Germans won’t be fooled and will perceive it as a mobilization) 2. it doesn’t solve the problem of advancing from the rear (it’s one thing to call up the population in the Urals for training, and quite another to move divisions out of the Urals). Accordingly, the BUS is not a magic bullet but a small bonus. If mass preparations for war are exposed, the Germans will begin an emergency troop redeployment to the border and complete it sooner. Consequently, the goal is not to preempt German deployment but to neutralize their deployment advantage so that it cannot become a decisive factor.
Alongside the previous objective is the task of training the Red Army in combat. Naturally, conditions had to be created that would prevent the Germans from carrying out rapid breakthroughs and encirclements. And in 1941, there were periods when the Germans did indeed encounter problems with their rapid breakthroughs and encirclements—the autumn mud season. As it happened, deep snow and wet soil—combined with the USSR’s road network consisting almost entirely of dirt roads—drastically slowed down transport, complicated movement, while having no impact on strategic troop movements or mobilization itself, since these depend primarily on rail transport.
Paradoxically, if the USSR were to attack Germany after France’s surrender, the best time would be from the fall mud season through the spring mud season. The ideal scenario would be the spring mud season.
The first and very significant part of the AI is not shown here—prewar preparations. Now, since the USSR knows the exact date the war will begin—which makes sense, since the USSR itself will be the aggressor—many decisions to boost combat readiness will become both possible and justified: industry will be shifted to a war footing, many long-term civilian projects will be postponed, while military projects, on the contrary, are accelerated. Minor optimizations are carried out, such as the manual distribution of 76 mm armor-piercing ammunition and other measures to address similar issues. In reality, these measures were not implemented because the problems were temporary, and the army was accustomed to the idea that such issues would resolve themselves and did not warrant a solution. On the eve of war, however, such problems would be addressed and resolved to the extent possible. For example, those same armor-piercing shells could be transferred from the Far Eastern, Central Asian, and Caucasus military districts. Conversely, 85-mm guns—for which there is a shortage of shells—could be transferred to inactive units. There is no point in even discussing the formation of tank corps if there is no way to equip them with tanks.
The diplomatic aspect of AI is also interesting, but diplomatic success is not guaranteed, so there’s no point in discussing it in detail. In general terms, as early as October, you should actively work to balance the trade deficit with Germany. You should also begin secret negotiations with England regarding entering the war against Germany in exchange for certain concessions.
We shouldn’t expect much from the British, but through them we can reach the U.S., where we can immediately negotiate a Lend-Lease agreement and the sale to the USSR of a number of goods vital to the war effort—including on credit, which will be canceled as soon as war is declared between the USSR and Germany. In this situation, the Soviet Union is not a supplicant but a savior—and “Britain’s last hope”—so we can secure quite a few perks, even if only in the form of orders that will be delivered only after the war begins.
Given the steep slopes along the border defense line, the decision was made to rely not on massive, multi-story monolithic bunkers with walls several meters thick, but on timber-and-earth fortifications reinforced with prefabricated concrete elements.
Special mention should be made of the policy toward the population and industry in the newly annexed territories. Given the dangerous situation at the outbreak of war, a withdrawal to the old border is envisaged, which raises the question of how to treat territory that will likely be occupied in the future. Under the guise of integration into the Soviet economy, the plan is to relocate key industries to the east as part of a consolidation effort and to offer resettlers preferential terms to encourage the relocation of key specialists; since these terms will be revoked due to wartime conditions, generous promises can be made. At the same time, this achieves a mixing of populations. Meanwhile, workers and construction workers from the USSR will be sent eastward, but only after military training; they will be rapidly mobilized just before the war begins, sharply increasing the size of the second-echelon forces.
The detailed section of the AI begins with the winter training exercises. These large-scale winter training exercises are explained to outside observers as a way to test whether the lessons of the Winter War have been learned, and from an economic perspective—collective farmers have already finished their work related to the final harvest but have not yet begun preparing for planting season— at which point a relatively large-scale draft will have less of an impact on the economy. The first stage of the BUS takes place primarily in the country’s interior regions; its real purpose is to reinforce the small units in those areas and give them time to develop combat cohesion before the war. Furthermore, this poses no direct threat to the Germans, and a sharp reaction on their part is unlikely, given that intelligence will have only a vague understanding of the true scale of the covert mobilization. In total, up to 500,000 people will be drafted during this phase, but 100,000 will be sent to the Far East, and no more than 150,000 to the western districts.
The next stage is an additional draft. Theoretically, after this, the units that have completed their training should be disbanded, but this will not happen; on the contrary, the divisions that have already been assembled will begin to be redeployed closer to the future front line. This will take place as early as mid-February. At this time, German intelligence will be sending out hints, but they cannot be unequivocally identified. Canaris did not report on the new Soviet tanks, let alone specific details regarding the rotation of divisions. And at this stage, these will indeed be rotations—some of the 3,000-strong divisions will head east, firstly for the sake of secrecy, and secondly so that they can be quickly replenished with conscripts there in subsequent stages.
The third stage is the final one. It begins in early March, when temperatures start to rise to near-zero levels. This is a narrow window of opportunity during which a successful attack becomes possible. If the Germans aren’t ready by this point, it’s already too late for them, and we can go ahead without hesitation. A virtually open mobilization begins, although it is still referred to as BUS. In response to German accusations of aggression, the Germans are openly accused of aggression themselves, while the actions of the Soviet leadership are declared a response to German actions (up to and including the open announcement of partial mobilization, which is not particularly different from regular mobilization). With the start of this phase, a plan to secure the border is put into effect, and all troops take up their positions on alert. Now, whenever the war begins, the Red Army soldiers will meet it spread out across trenches and dugouts. In addition, the soldiers occupying the trenches dug in advance begin to expand the network of fortifications, and with each passing day that the German offensive is delayed, the defenses will grow ever stronger. The second echelon is rapidly advancing toward the main line of defense and reinforcing the first. Mobile forces—tank, motorized, mechanized, and cavalry units—remain in reserve.
Meanwhile, the air force is dispersing to field airfields. The problem for the air force during this period is that dirt airfields are also partially susceptible to muddy conditions. Therefore, during the period of threat, it will be necessary to rely on permanent airfields with concrete runways; these must be protected by heavy anti-aircraft artillery, bearing in mind that, in hindsight, it is precisely these airfields that will draw the main forces of the Luftwaffe’s strike aviation.
On land, an order is issued to destroy and capture all German troops on Soviet territory, and considerable latitude is granted in retaliatory fire on German territory, including the freedom to fire upon enemy troops preparing for an attack if they form up in battle order and attempt to attack Soviet territory, as well as broad authority to conduct symmetrical retaliatory fire. In the long term, in the event of large-scale hostilities, the order will treat the Wehrmacht as an enemy army regardless of territory.
Ultimately, it is expected that, following mobilization in the midst of the spring thaw, the USSR will officially declare war on Germany. However, it is likely that the Germans, having a slight lead over the Red Army in terms of deployment, will do so earlier; therefore, the troops must be legally, morally, and logistically prepared to face the enemy. The most likely scenario is repelling the expected German attack during a brief cold snap in the second half of March.
This is where the results begin and where the most complex part of the AI comes into play, since—apart from a different start date for the war and a better-prepared mobilization—the remaining variables are unknown; the air force and armored vehicles could be either realistic or completely alternative. — AI related to shifting the war’s start date is the main focus here, and most of the tactical and organizational AI scenarios presented on the site can be integrated into this.
If we assume that the technical aspects will remain unchanged, the situation will unfold roughly as follows: the Germans will cross the border and launch a series of powerful attacks, and—despite all orders—will succeed in throwing the soldiers and commanders into confusion during the initial phase — even though everyone had been preparing for war and had been expecting an attack every day for the past week, the war began suddenly. From the very first days of the war, the Germans managed in many places to break through the defensive lines and establish bridgeheads on the eastern banks of the border rivers. But in most places, their advance quickly stalled against the fortifications. In theory, many secondary attacks should have failed outright, since artillery, guided by wire communications, was supposed to concentrate its fire on the breach and crush the border violators, but it was unable to do so. Nevertheless, the defenses in the secondary sectors held, thanks to the large number of defenders.
On the main axes of attack, things were moving more slowly than in the Russian Front; however, by the standards of the Western Front, a rapid offensive was unfolding there. The infantry immediately charged forward and then began to retreat chaotically from their positions; even though there were one and a half to two times as many divisions in the area, there were still not enough of them to mount a solid defense according to all standards. the suddenness and coordination of the Germans’ actions, combined with the chaos in the Red Army, prevented them from making full use of the border fortifications, and the Germans’ initial successes bled the defense dry and further disorganized it, turning the soldiers into a haphazardly firing mob—just like in a role-playing game, except that the mud and a major initial hiccup slowed the process down.
On the very first day, the Germans began moving mobile units into the breach, but these units quickly ran into Soviet reserves that had been deployed to the area. The Germans paid almost no attention to Soviet tank counterattacks carried out with outdated armored vehicles; numerous motorized infantry units, generously supported by light anti-tank guns, anti-tank rifles, and rifles loaded with armor-piercing rounds easily wiped out the disorganized attacking herds of light armored vehicles; only on a few fronts did the Germans encounter heavy tank units and a very small number of T-34s. These units came as a very unpleasant surprise, but due to relatively high march losses—caused mainly by unnecessary maneuvers—and their ill-considered deployment without support, they did not play a significant role.
However, the cavalry and motorized infantry that arrived on the scene, reinforced by anti-tank brigades, proved to be a very formidable opponent for the German tank crews. Due to poor coordination and disorganization, a unified system failed to materialize, and the mobile units bypassed and encircled Soviet forces, confidently repelling counterattacks. But the advance itself stalled significantly. German mobile units confidently defeated the Soviets with a favorable casualty ratio, particularly in terms of tanks, even accounting for replacements. But the pace of the offensive was lost.
From the start of the war, the Soviet Air Force found itself in a difficult position—it was sent to fight German troops at the very same time that the Luftwaffe was focusing its efforts on them. The first strike was unexpected and devastating, though not as devastating as in the Red Army. Then the air force got into a routine—everything was as usual for the Soviet air force in 1941—attack aircraft without cover tried to attack tanks, mostly to no avail, while fighters patrolled in endless sorties, squandering fuel and engine life by exposing themselves to German free-roaming fighters and allowing them to rack up double-digit kill counts right at the start of the war. But the smooth withdrawal of ground forces allowed them to retreat from the border without catastrophic losses, while deep in German territory, the Luftwaffe fought fiercely with the Wehrmacht for the right to duel with the Soviet Air Force. German aces also suffered losses, especially at the hands of new types of fighters that took the Germans by unpleasant surprise; their numbers continued to grow, and Soviet pilots were learning quickly, so the remaining German pilots were no longer easy targets. As for ground-attack aircraft, the situation was a complete disaster; the only hope lay with the Pe-2 and Il-2, whose production was just getting underway.
On the very first day, the GKTO was established; in fact, this was merely a formal recognition of a body that had already been in existence for several months and was de facto governing the country. The leadership was surprised by some failures on the ground but quickly assessed the situation, sending reinforcements to the sites of German breakthroughs. While mobilization was underway in the country—a process that had begun a week before the war started—as much as possible was being done with the rear; evacuation was impossible but was not urgently needed either. The necessity of forming new divisions had already been recognized, and preparations for this were gradually being made. The conversion of industry to a war footing had already been underway for several months, along with extended shifts at military factories, and stockpiles of raw materials had been accumulated in advance in factory warehouses so as not to tie up the railways at the start of the war.
Meanwhile, seeing the situation gradually deteriorate, the Soviet leadership began issuing orders one after another for entire armies—and soon entire fronts—to retreat. This disrupted the defenses of the infantry units, which were just beginning to make headway, and partly spread a sense of defeatism and panic among the troops—this was not how the soldiers had imagined this war, but it did prevent large masses of troops from being surrounded; only small-scale tactical encirclements occurred. Nevertheless, the ratio of losses—especially when taking into account prisoners of war and deserters—was disheartening for the USSR. But it was not as catastrophic as in the Russian Empire.
Meanwhile, mobilization continued unabated, and fresh divisions were often thrown straight into the path of German tanks. These divisions were not particularly combat-ready, but the Germans refrained from destroying them with a head-on attack. Tanks were rapidly running out, though most of them could be repaired—it just would take time. There wasn’t enough fuel for large-scale encirclements, and there weren’t enough shells for a classic head-on infantry-artillery battle. More precisely, the shells were available, but they were stored in depots far behind the front lines, and it was impossible to transport them over the muddy roads. The infantry faced the same problem. Although the new Soviet defensive line was cracking at the seams, it was impossible to launch an immediate offensive—the troops were cut off from their supply depots by at least a hundred kilometers, and resupplying them had become impossible.
By the end of April, the spring thaw had begun to subside, and German troops gradually prepared for an offensive: they restored their equipment and personnel and reinforced their tank units as best they could, but a completely different Red Army awaited them. It had already proven itself in a series of local skirmishes and completed its mobilization. Now, having been more or less reinforced with infantry at the expense of their logistical units, the rifle divisions prepared to repel German attacks with their largely intact and numerous artillery, while the mobile units, though severely depleted in numbers, blocked the most dangerous directions for an offensive. The air force was ready to assist ground forces to the best of its ability, and the navy had already begun actively disrupting German shipping in the Baltic Sea. Industry, having already switched to a war footing, was either ramping up production to supply the front with additional weapons and ammunition or had begun evacuation efforts.
R.S. The future remains unclear. On the one hand, the Red Army is much stronger than at any point in 1941, and it has a solid front. On the other hand, it lacks experience in conducting offensives, and there isn’t much to commit to a breakthrough anyway, so all local offensives are doomed to failure or tactical success—but they will prevent the Wehrmacht from carrying out full-scale offensives (similar to the Rzhev meat grinder). Ultimately, however, it is practically impossible to avoid new encirclements in the long run—including some on a fairly large scale—and the Germans’ further advance eastward is inevitable. At the same time, turmoil will break out in the Balkans; it is highly likely that Italy will invade Greece after all, and this will result in the loss of Albania and heavy casualties in the Italian army. At the same time, the prospect of Yugoslavia siding with the Allies seems quite realistic, and this is a very unpleasant alternative for Germany—an enemy has taken up position right under its belly, and there is simply no time to drive it out.
